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Paolo G. Carozza
“They are our brothers, and
Christ gave His life for them”
The Catholic Tradition and the Idea
of Human Rights in Latin America
Through the language of human rights, law can both reflect
and constitute some of our most basic ideas about the requirements
of human dignity and the human desire for freedom. It captures
certain culturally embedded understandings about the nature of the
human person in society and carries them forward in time through
an institutionalized discourse and practice. This is especially so in
those legal traditions that have inherited Western law’s historically
consistent orientation toward the individual. Law never makes those
sorts of claims in a systematically theoretical way, however. Instead,
it is a form of praxis,combining theory and practice, speculation and
experience. In this essay I will explore the way that an idea of human
rights, one deeply influenced by Catholic traditions of thought about
the nature of the human person, was given shape in the mold of his-
torical experience in Latin America and then carried forward
through the language of law. Out of that praxis, Latin America forged
a distinctive way of talking about and understanding human rights—
its own particular accent, as it were, of a language that in the last fifty
years has become global.
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The Latin American Contribution to Legitimate Pluralism
To some it may seem a little self-contradictory to speak of a pur-
portedly universal language—human rights—in terms that deliber-
ately seek to emphasize local or regional particularities. It is certainly
true that human rights has become, globally, the most recognizable
and accessible form of communication across cultures regarding the
minimal standards of human decency and dignity. This is because
there is a basic way in which the terms of human rights genuinely
reflect certain universal human desires—the hopes and needs of
every human heart for justice and freedom.
The problem, of course, is that the language of human rights is
necessarily open-ended, abstract, and to a certain degree indeter-
minate. It has to be so precisely as a function of its capacity to
embrace the many varied expressions of its core ideals in the differ-
ent concrete historical circumstances of all of the human family,
across time and space. The result is that the single language of human
rights does have—indeed, it must have—different “dialects.” The
virtue of this openness is its flexibility and adaptability, its capacity
to accommodate the search for truth and meaning that characterizes
every genuinely human culture the world has ever known. It recog-
nizes, implicitly, that a person’s quest for freedom and justice
depends on being situated in a history and in a community that pro-
vides that person with a first proposal for leading a flourishing life.
But the openness of human rights language also has a darker side:
indeterminacy can mean manipulability too. It can mean, for
instance, that one partial view of the meaning of human rights—
which is the meaning of humanity and society, really—can capture
the entire discourse. Then that view not only dominates, but it dom-
inates with the legitimating aura of a universal ethical language. This
is the danger, in other words, that human rights will be the blunt
instrument of enforcing a global conformity to the culture of the
rich and powerful, who are able to say, “My rights must be your
rights, whether you think so or not.” Alternatively, the openness
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and indeterminacy of the idea of human rights can lead to the emp-
tying of the concept, to the evacuation of its meaning and its replace-
ment by a relativization of the underlying truth about the human
person of which the idea of human rights is a sign. This is the dan-
ger of the cruder forms of a so-called “cultural relativism”: “Your
American rights are not my Asian rights nor her African ones,
because there is no true commonality among us.” Note that here, just
as in the case of human rights becoming the tool of an imperial
global culture, the end result of severing human rights from our
common humanity is that the content and meaning of human rights
becomes determined only by convention and ideology, by the whims
of the powerful.
To sum this up in another way, the paradox of the idea of human
rights is that the very quality that allows it to serve as a universal,
cross-cultural language of justice and dignity is the same quality that
poses a danger of deforming the idea into an instrument of oppres-
sion and colonialism instead of liberation and dignity. It follows,
then, that the task of cultivating a legitimate pluralism within the
universal idea of human rights is a critical part of making the promise
of human rights possible. Embracing legitimate pluralism is a recog-
nition that, in the words of John Paul II, “every culture is an effort
to ponder the mystery of the world and in particular of the human
person.”1
The pope made that observation as part of a speech praising the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “one of the highest
expressions of the human conscience of our time.”2 And indeed,
since its approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations in
, the Universal Declaration has become the single most recog-
nizable and influential reference point for cross-cultural communi-
cation about humanity’s longing for justice and freedom—universal
in more than just name. But when the declaration was drafted, its
framers were well aware of the need for legitimate pluralism and of
the potential dangers that human rights posed in its absence. That is
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one of the reasons they sought to avoid tying the declaration too
closely to any one cultural context and why they took great care to
draw broadly from a diverse set of understandings in order to fash-
ion this universal declaration.3
Against this background, one of the most interesting things that
has been brought back to our attention recently as a result of some
of the most current research on the origins of the Universal Decla-
ration, has been the immensely important contribution that was
made by Latin Americans to the genesis of the document.4 As indi-
vidual representatives of their countries, and as groups working
together, members of the Latin American delegations provided crit-
ical political and intellectual initiative. Without that initiative, the
Universal Declaration would certainly have looked very different, if
indeed it existed at all. Most notably, Latin American proposals
formed the first models on which the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights was drafted, and many of the rights in it were insert-
ed or modified in important ways through the intervention of Latin
American delegates—ways that emphasized, for example, the uni-
versality of human rights, the equality of men and women, the cen-
trality of family life, and the importance of economic and social
rights. Overall, both the depth of their commitment to the idea of
human rights and the particular accent they gave to its expression
were quite remarkable.
That story is still far too unknown, but it has been told elsewhere,
and it is not my aim to retell it here.5 But the story does provoke fur-
ther questions. Where did this deep and broad Latin American com-
mitment to the idea of human rights in  come from? And what
accounts for the particular understanding they gave to the idea?
Already these questions take us out of the realm of the most con-
ventional attitudes toward human rights and Latin America. Even
among human rights enthusiasts and activists, the South American
continent has long been the object of human rights concerns more
than a contributor to human rights thinking. Or rather, its “contribu-
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tions” have been perceived almost exclusively in negative terms: the
creativity of its repressive regimes in fashioning new forms of abuse
like the “disappearance,” provoked the governments and human
rights organizations of Europe and North America to come up with
new norms and institutions to address the problems. Or, more
recently, the impunity with which its former dictators elect to trav-
el in Europe has sparked a significant development of the principles
of universal jurisdiction. But the affirmative dimensions of human
rights in Latin America almost always have been seen to be the poor
relatives of grand, rich, European ideas.
For that reason, the effort to identify the roots of any distinctive
Latin American tradition of human rights needs to start at the begin-
ning and to try to synthesize centuries of intellectual history, recast-
ing it in terms of its own protagonists rather than as a tarnished,
inferior copy of northern intellectual history. In this process I will
need to be selective, rather than exhaustive, identifying a few strands
of thought and following them through time in order to make them
vivid again today. It is not so much a detailed, continuous chronol-
ogy, but rather a family history skipping across events, generations,
and geography like a novel by Gabriel García Márquez in which a sin-
gle anecdote evokes a richer collective memory. The challenge here
is to recognize and articulate some distinctive and unifying tropes to
the tale.
In particular, I will focus my attention on three moments in this
family history that I believe were critical watersheds in giving the
Latin American human rights tradition its particular cast. First is
the ethical response to the injustices of the early Spanish conquest
and colonialism as embodied particularly in the life and works of
Bartolomé de Las Casas, the sixteenth-century Dominican mission-
ary and later bishop of Chiapas. Second is the late eighteenth century
and the triumph of liberal revolutionary ideas from the Latin Amer-
ican reaction to the French Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man and the Citizen, through the thought of Simón Bolívar, to
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conceptions of human rights discernable in early republican consti-
tutions. Third is the Mexican Constitution of —one of the
most immediately and widely influential constitutional documents in
the history of the region.
The Midwife of Modern Human Rights Talk
The modern idea of human rights had a period of gestation lasting
millennia. But it would be fair to say, even if it is not commonly rec-
ognized, that the birth of human rights was in the encounter
between sixteenth-century Spanish neo-scholasticism and the New
World. If that encounter were embodied in a single person, it would
be Bartolomé de Las Casas.6
Las Casas first came to the Indies from Spain at age eighteen in
, and after his ordination a few years later, he served as a chap-
lain during the Spanish conquest of Cuba. Like many other clerics in
the West Indies, Las Casas lived off the toil of the Native Americans
of his encomienda—the system by which Spanish colonists were given
tracts of land and the rights to the forced labor of the native people
in return for the promise to instruct them in the Catholic faith. At
the time, the foremost critics of Spanish brutality were the Domini-
can friars in the Indies. They were already condemning the Cuban
conquest while Las Casas participated in it, but he remained unper-
suaded, even after one Dominican refused to hear Las Casas’s con-
fession because he owned slaves. But after a profound conversion of
conscience in , Las Casas arranged to free his slaves and began
a lifelong, passionate devotion to the cause of just and humane treat-
ment of the indigenous peoples. Perhaps in no other time or place
has a single man’s life and work so deeply embodied the cry for jus-
tice of a whole continent.
After an early experiment founding a model community of
peaceful farmers and traders turned out to be a spectacular failure,
Las Casas entered the Order of Preachers and turned toward the
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Dominican charism of study and reflection. He spent most of the
next decade and a half serving the cause of the Indians by producing
a flood of treatises, memorials, and testimonies before emerging
from his self-described “slumber” to become active again as the “Pro-
tector of the Indians,” the official state office to which he was
appointed by the crown. He crisscrossed Spanish America from Peru
to Guatemala, campaigning against conquest, and travelled on many
occasions to Europe to plead his case before the court. Las Casas’s
arguments against the encomienda system and the sensational accounts
of the cruelty and neofeudalism of the conquistadores in his book, His-
tory of the Indies, persuaded Charles V to promulgate the New Laws
in . These laws were supposed to ensure that no more Indians
would be enslaved, and the laws were intended to deprive officials
of their encomiendas, although the implementation and enforcement
of the New Laws proved to be next to impossible from the start.
After a brief, troubled tenure as bishop of the poor of Chiapas,
Las Casas became ever more enmeshed in scandal and controversy.
He had his Confesionario—the rules for confessors that he had com-
posed—confiscated because it insisted that every penitent be
required to free his Indian slaves and make full restitution of all the
Spaniards’ unjustly acquired wealth in the New World. This seemed
to call into question the very legitimacy of Spain’s claim to rule the
Indies, and Las Casas was accused of treason. Everything came to a
head when, in , the emperor halted all conquests and instruct-
ed a panel of theologians and jurists to hear both Las Casas and his
principal intellectual enemy, Juan de Sepúlveda, debate the justice
and lawfulness of the Spanish occupation of the Americas. These
famous debates in Valladolid in  and  were in a sense the
climax of Las Casas’s advocacy, even though ultimately inconclusive
in their outcome. After , Las Casas remained in Spain until his
death, actively writing, exhorting, proclaiming, and beseeching with
all the fervor of the prophet Jeremiah.
Any portion of Las Casas’s rich life is full of tales worth
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recounting, but especially notable is the way he succeeded in artic-
ulating and advocating a set of ideas that in many senses represent the
first clear announcement of the modern language of human rights.
This may need a word of explanation. Las Casas has sometimes been
regarded as somewhat of a second-rate thinker, whose understand-
ings of philosophy and theology were not up to the standard of his
senior Dominican brother in the School of Salamanca, Francisco de
Vitoria. While Vitoria is universally regarded as a brilliant light of his
era, Las Casas has often been relegated to Vitoria’s shadow. The
criticisms have sometimes been quite harsh: he was too polemical in
rhetoric, too unsystematic and undisciplined in thought, a dema-
gogue in practice. Why begin with the lesser disciple, then, instead
of the master? The thing that distinguishes Las Casas from his con-
temporaries is his combination of speculation and experience, his
engagement in practice with the struggle for justice. He never set
out to reason abstractly about the duties and rights associated with
the Spanish presence in the Indies, but rather formed his under-
standing of the requirements of justice in the crucible of action and
in the face of lived necessity. (In this, by the way, he foreshadowed
the typical dynamic of how human rights thinking developed in the
twentieth century too.) In doing so, he contributed to the idea of
human rights in a way that was unique and not simply derivative of
Spanish thought. Las Casas became the first notable American pro-
ponent of the idea of human rights.
Admittedly, the way Las Casas meshed theory and practice can
make it difficult to synthesize his views. They are not set out with the
patient and thoughtful rigor of a philosopher, but with a litigator’s
focus on the practical results sought in the dispute at hand. Las
Casas, therefore, grabs arguments to serve his cause wherever he can
find them and is eclectic in choosing his sources. Nevertheless, a few
core ideas persist throughout his work.
First, Las Casas constantly framed the requirements of justice in
terms of the rights of the Indians. The importance of this must not
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be understated simply because this language is so familiar to us
today. Brian Tierney’s careful work of intellectual history shows us
that Las Casas’s pervasive use of the language of natural rights rep-
resents a conscious and systematic grafting of the juridical language
of Roman and canon law onto Aquinas’s teaching on natural law.7
This was a direct result of the style of advocacy to which I alluded
earlier—Las Casas drew from law, philosophy, theology, and direct
experience almost indistinguishably, and his moral arguments are lit-
tered with juridical sources and language. The result, Tierney
argues, was a language of natural rights that was not found in
Thomas, but that could be said to be a recognizable and natural
extension of the Thomistic tradition. In this way, Las Casas was
innovative and, at the same time, was in deep continuity with the
intellectual and moral tradition in which he was formed. This
allowed him to make the theoretical doctrines of natural rights,
which were being developed elsewhere, applicable to concrete his-
torical situations and to the most practical and pressing moral prob-
lems of his day. The pragmatic interplay between law and philosophy
that his work exemplified decisively influenced the development of
subsequent natural rights theories.
As for Las Casas’s understanding of the foundations of the rights
of the Indians, many of his voluminous polemics on behalf of the
native peoples can be contained in one simple, eloquent phrase he
used to conclude his rebuttal of Sepúlveda in the Valladolid debates.
While his rival argued that the Indians were beastlike “natural
slaves,” Las Casas affirmed that “they are our brothers, and Christ
gave His life for them.”8 His case is based on the first principle of the
unity of the human family. This puts his notion of natural rights on
a decidedly universal plane. One of his most famous statements
proclaims,
All the races of the World are men, and of all men and of each
individual there is but one definition, and this is that they are
rational. All have understanding and will and free choice, as all
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are made in the image and likeness of God. . . . Thus the
entire human race is one.9
First and foremost, the rights that Las Casas sought for the native
peoples were theirs simply by virtue of their humanity—a human-
ity common to all of God’s children.
It is well to note Las Casas’s stress on the idea that the Indians’
fundamental humanity meant that they were created with freedom.
His early treatise titled On the Only Way of Attracting All Peoples to the
True Religion, which was dedicated to condemning forcible Chris-
tianization of the Indians by military means, is an extended appeal to
the liberty of the indigenous peoples. They needed to be persuaded
to accept truth, Las Casas argued, by the peaceful methods of rea-
son, love, and the living example of practiced virtue. Las Casas took
this position so seriously that he went as far as defending some of the
native populations’ practice of human sacrifice. Of course, he didn’t
defend human sacrifice as such, but rather insisted that the indige-
nous peoples needed to be educated through peaceful persuasion and
that even their use of human sacrifice could not justify military con-
quest and forcible submission. This is, implicitly, more than an indi-
vidualistic liberty. In Las Casas’s work, freedom is rooted in and
expressed thorough the beliefs, practices, and authority of the com-
munity. Combined with his detailed and deeply appreciative writing
about the customs and practices of the native populations he encoun-
tered, Las Casas’s defense of the freedom of the Indians has strong
elements of what today we would regard as a defense of their cul-
tural integrity and sovereignty.
There is some risk, I suppose, that in making such an observation
I am reading Las Casas anachronistically. But I wouldn’t be the first
to do so. One of the things that is most interesting about Las Casas
in the context of the larger history of the idea of human rights in
Latin America is the way that other historical periods have gone
back to Las Casas to claim ancestry and inspiration from his exam-
ple. This was certainly the case two and a half centuries later, when
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Simón Bolívar, the Liberator, would refer to Las Casas as the “Apos-
tle of the Americas,” and “a humane hero.” Bolívar even suggested
naming the new capital city of his proposed Pan-American Union
“Las Casas.”10
Revolution, Rights, Rousseau
Bolívar himself, of course, lies at the epicenter of the continental
upheavals associated with the next historical “moment” I want to
explore: the birth of the first constitutional republics in Latin Amer-
ica. Bolívar’s life, words, and works tower over the era, but they need
to be understood within a certain context.
Most conventional histories of the idea of human rights in Latin
America, including by Latin Americans themselves, tend to identi-
fy the intellectual and political roots of the continent’s commitment
to rights language with the importation of European Enlightenment
ideologies and the inspirations of the revolutionary movements of
France and North America.11 This is not unreasonable. The intel-
lectual and political elites of the Spanish colonies did provide a ready
audience for the ideas of Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Smith,
Paine, and others. They commonly held intellectual salons, or tertu-
lias, to share these perspectives. Political pamphlets entered the
colonies from abroad, including the enormously influential French
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. North American naval
officers visiting South American ports also disseminated the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.
European scientists, such as von Humboldt, on their expeditions to
America, were the sources of inflammatory political ideas.12
But it is simplistic to just see this traffic as a one-way transplan-
tation of ideas that remained in the greenhouse of Latin America as
unchanged as they were in their original garden. This view begs
two questions. Continuing with this metaphor, we need to ask first
how the soil in which the shoots were received was different, and
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second, how the new environment affected their subsequent growth.
In both cases, there is good reason to understand the seed of Euro-
pean and North American rights language to have produced a dis-
tinctive fruit in the Latin American experience.
Take, for instance, the role of the French Declaration of the Rights
of Man and the Citizen. Even before being translated into Spanish in
the colonies, the declaration was banned in  by the Tribunal of
the Holy Inquisition of Cartagena. Nevertheless, in , Antonio
Nariño translated the declaration and circulated it in New Granada,
for which he was rewarded with imprisonment, exile, and the con-
fiscation of his property. A few years later, one band of conspirators
sought to oust the capitán general of Venezuela with a force of five hun-
dred men who were carrying arms and distributing copies of the
declaration. Other examples show that knowledge of and commit-
ment to the principles of the French declaration were tremendous—
to the point that one Venezuelan author described it as “a yearning,
one could almost say an obsession” to make the French declaration
into “the gospel of the new era that humanity was beginning to live.”13
At the same time, the ideology of the declaration in Latin Amer-
ica generally did not have the same strongly anticlerical orientation
that it did in France. Many of the same revolutionaries who carried
the banner of the declaration considered it fundamental to their
constitutional ideas that the state would be a confessional one, with
the recognition and protection of the Roman Catholic faith firmly
at its core—indeed that was one of the few constants of the region’s
constitutional thinking in this period.14 More generally, one of the
remarkable features of the diffusion of the declaration was that its
principles typically do not seem to have been regarded as express-
ing a fundamental rupture with the Latin Americans’ prevailing
precepts of political ethics. In fact, the declaration was seen by
many as a synthesis of the principles long taught in the great colo-
nial universities. Working from Aquinas, Suarez and Vitoria, Juan de
Mariana and Luis Molina, and others primarily in the scholastic
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tradition, it was commonplace to teach doctrines such as the pri-
ority of natural law over written law, the legitimacy of resistance to
tyranny and unjust laws, and most of all, the existence of certain
imprescriptable rights and guarantees due to every man by virtue
of his humanity. It was not by accident that the Spanish crown, in the
years leading up to the American revolts, tried unsuccessfully to ban
all teaching of public law in the colonial universities. Even more
telling, we know that Antonio Nariño, after he was arrested for hav-
ing translated and disseminated the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Citizen, defended himself by arguing that the most
important articles of the declaration were merely reflections of the
doctrines of St. Thomas that were being taught in the universi-
ties.15 In short, the rights talk of the French declaration had a
unique ground in which to grow in Latin America, one that explic-
itly drew nourishment from, rather than rejecting, the continent’s
tradition of Catholic thought.
When it came time to fashion constitutions for the nascent Amer-
ican republics, the French declaration served as the principal source
for individual rights and guarantees, but in light of the history pre-
viously described, we may reasonably see it as a document with a
somewhat different meaning—in the context of Latin America, it
represents more of a synthesis of the Enlightenment’s liberal, secu-
larized version of natural law and the scholastic natural law tradition
that had preceded it.
The new constitutions and their statements of rights also repre-
sent a different sort of convergence of traditions, the knitting togeth-
er of two separate strands of Western legal thought. Even though the
French declaration did exert a strong influence on the rights talk of
the revolutionary moment, the United States discourse of rights
was also well known, from Thomas Paine to the Declaration of
Rights of the Constitution of Virginia and the constitutive
documents of the U.S. federation. In drafting their constitutions, the
new Latin American republics adopted structures that overall strongly
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reflected the models of their neighbors to the north. Ever since, one
of the most notable characteristics of Latin American legal systems
has been their fusion of North American concepts of public law onto
a base that is fundamentally a part of the Romano-Germanic legal tra-
dition of Continental Europe. In terms of human rights, this dynam-
ic created a unique confluence of ideas. The dominant genes of the
idea of human rights in the early Latin American republics were
undoubtedly inherited from Rousseau. Rights discourse in that tra-
dition, when compared to its North American cousin of the same
generation, exhibits more concern for equality and fraternity and less
exclusive emphasis on liberty; it highlights the positive role of law as
a pedagogical instrument for the cultivation of virtue and therefore
is more willing to stress the duties that are correlative to individual
rights. For all those reasons, the Rousseauian accent on rights tends
to view government intervention much more favorably—it is not just
a threat to liberty, but in many cases is essential to the securing of
rights together with responsibilities.16
This is where we can return to Simón Bolívar, who most clearly
embodies the political consciousness of the time. He was a military
leader who liberated five nations from Spanish tutelage, a statesman
and author of constitutions, a clear-eyed realist who clairvoyantly pre-
dicted much of the bleak future of the continent, and a romantic
dreamer of international unity. But before all these he was a true dis-
ciple of Rousseau. Bolívar’s long-time tutor and companion, the
eccentric Simón Rodríguez, was utterly consumed by Rousseau.
Rodríguez was not content just with teaching the philosopher’s ideas
to Bolívar; he practically made his student a living subject of
Rousseau’s pedagogical principles—a true Émile, as it were—and
years later Bolívar would write to his former tutor “You cannot imag-
ine how deeply the books you gave me are engraved on my heart. I
have not been able to omit even a single comma from these great the-
ses which you presented to me. They have ever been before my men-
tal eye, and I have followed them as I would an infallible leader.”17
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It is not surprising, then, that no other figure is more frequently
invoked by Bolívar in his speeches and writing than Rousseau, or that
Simón’s language of rights might just as well be that of Jean-Jacques.
Bolívar was firmly committed to the constitutional recognition of
basic individual liberty; he reserved a special abhorrence of slavery,
regarding it as a “shameless violation of human dignity” and any law
perpetuating slavery to be a “sacrilege.” He also referred to equality
as “that law of laws” without which all other rights and safeguards
would vanish; he vigorously defended rights to material security such
as the recognition and protection of private property.18 But, for
Bolívar, at their core all of these rights depended on two fundamen-
tal things. The first was the natural liberty of man as a creature of the
Divine. “If there were no Protector of Innocence and freedom,” he
proclaimed,
I should prefer the life of a great-hearted lion, lording it in the
wilderness and the forests. . . . But no! God has willed free-
dom to man, who protects it in order to exercise the divine
faculty of free will.19
The second foundation, though, puts that divinely ordained liberty
firmly within a Rousseauian understanding of law and government.
Bolívar believed that a person arrives at freedom by means of soci-
ety and the state and, therefore, liberty is the result of an assiduous
education of character that is obtained through appropriate legisla-
tion and a virtuous government.20
As previously mentioned, Rousseau’s—and Bolívar’s—under-
standings were not the only tradition of thought at work in the
new constitutions of Latin America. The North American constitu-
tions provided useful examples as well. The basic concept of indi-
vidual constitutional rights, especially in a judicially enforceable
form, reflected something of a North American twist. Rights were
then placed in the context of constitutional structures that im-
plicitly drew, to some degree, from the U.S. example of limited
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government, separation of powers, and more negative understand-
ings of liberty. The end result of this commingling of constitutional
traditions was that the early Latin American nations provided strong
examples of constitutionalized individual rights long before the
countries of Europe, but did so with a substantive understanding of
the content of the rights that was different from the more Lockean,
libertarian, property-based notions dominant in most of the United
States (especially at the federal level).
The constitution of the Republic of Colombia of  is one
typical example.21 The constitution of the Republic of Colombia is
similar to the U.S. constitutive documents in the affirmation that
human individuals, qua human, have certain inalienable rights prior
to and above the state, and that the state is obliged to respect those
rights. Looking more particularly at the text, however, we can
immediately see serious divergences in understanding. Chapter XII
of the Colombian constitution is titled “On the Rights of Man and
the Citizen,” not only adopting the French title but also closely fol-
lowing the content of its French predecessor. Article  begins by
declaring, “The rights of man in society are legal equality and liber-
ty, security and property.” Article  continues, “Freedom has been
granted to man not in order to do good or evil without distinction,
but in order to choose to do good.” Even more striking is that chap-
ter XIII, titled “On the Duties of the Citizen” starts by emphasizing,
“The first obligation of the citizen aims at the preservation of soci-
ety and thus requires that those who constitute it know and fulfil
their respective duties.” This is followed by provisions such as arti-
cle , which specifies, “no one is a good citizen who is not a good
son, a good father, a good brother, a good friend, a good husband.”
This is far from the stuff of the U.S. Bill of Rights, with its few,
restrained, and terse injunctions like “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”
Many other constitutions of the era were comparable to the
Colombian constitution in their understandings of rights and duties,
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liberty and equality. In fact, between their independence and ,
the twenty independent Latin American countries adopted over two
hundred constitutions.22 During all of that time and through all of
those basic laws, however, one event stands out as the “coming of age”
of Latin American constitutionalism: the adoption of the Mexican
Constitution of  at the constitutional congress of Querétaro.
The Constitution of “New Things”
What was so uniquely important about the Mexican Constitution of
? Part of the answer lies in its timing. It was crafted at a time of
global upheaval and was the first constitution to begin to take into
account a world being reshaped by World War I, Russian unrest, sig-
nificant economic globalization, and the growing power of Latin
America’s northern neighbor, the United States. This period was fol-
lowed by an intense political ferment during which more than a
dozen other Latin American countries rewrote their constitutive
documents over a mere quarter century, making the Mexican con-
stitution the eldest sibling in a new family of twentieth-century con-
stitutions. The importance of the Mexican Constitution of  is
due even more to its content and specifically to its incorporation of
extensive social and economic guarantees and protections on top of
all the more classical rights of liberty and equality. The constitution’s
detailed provisions on labor, agrarian reform, education, and the
social dimensions of property rights were the first of its kind of any
constitution—not just in Latin America but in all the world. Its
principles were borrowed or imitated in varying degrees in nearly
every Latin American constitution thereafter and were felt in the
next wave of European constitutionalism as well.
The  Constitution is commonly regarded today as a “social-
ist” document (which reinforces again the implicit perception that
Latin American developments are merely derivative of European
creativity). This view probably arises not only from the document’s
“they are our brothers” 
04-logos-carozza-pp81-103  8/11/03  1:53 PM  Page 97
social protections but also from the very aggressive methods that it
sanctioned for achieving its goals: expropriation and redistribution
of property, nationalization, and a severe economic nationalism. The
constitution also acquired a certain overlay of ideology as a result of
the political stances of succeeding Mexican governments. Never-
theless, it is a misleadingly simplistic reduction to see it as socialist
in its original orientation. In fact, the constitution as a whole does
not reveal any consistent ideological stance; it is more of a hodge-
podge of contradictory ideas. Similarly, the debates of the constitu-
tional assembly are notable not for any advancement of socialist
ideas but for the nearly complete absence of any single or systemat-
ic set of economic or social theories— Ricardo, Mill, and even Pope
Leo XIII were as tacitly represented as Marx.23
Practically the only philosophical-juridical theme proposed as a
consistent underlying idea of the  Constitution at the time
when it was drafted is “the conviction that the human being, as a
human person, has rights prior to the state.”24 It is largely a docu-
ment about a certain vision of rights, one that encompasses social,
economic, and cultural spheres, as well as political and civil ones.
Where did the innovations in rights thinking come from? Not from
narrowly socialist ideas, to be sure. There is very strong evidence
that it was due, at least in significant part, to the pervasive presence
and influence of the Catholic social doctrines that developed out of
the first papal encyclical on the “social question,” Leo XIII’s Rerum
Novarum of .
That proposal might seem implausible because, after all, Mexico
was the paradigmatic anticlerical state—both under the dictatorship
of Porfirio Díaz that ended with the revolution of , and even
more under the terms of the  Constitution itself. A closer look
shows that there was a window thrown open to tolerance in those few
intervening years, which allowed the air of Catholic social mobiliza-
tion that had been quietly blowing since the turn of the century to
enter public discourse.25 Without much publicity, the Mexican
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Catholic Social Action movement began near the end of the nine-
teenth century, and the following decade witnessed four different
National Catholic Congresses, a number of gatherings known as
“Catholic social weeks,” and the organization of a confederation of
Catholic workers’ societies. The constant theme of these events was
a concern for poverty, the conditions of workers, education, and
agrarian reform. In , Mexico got its first and only political party
to bear the word “Catholic” in its name: the National Catholic Party.
The National Catholic Party’s explicit goal was to promote the prin-
ciples of Rerum Novarum. It sought factory legislation, protection of
labor unions, cooperatives, and land distribution to the poor. In some
states of the federation, including the central and populous state of
Jalisco, the National Catholic Party acquired control long enough to
actually implement some provisions of its legislative program. These
were widely seen as the vanguard of national reform efforts.
It is hard to pinpoint the influence of all this activity on the con-
stitutional congress of Querétaro and its  document. It is true
that one does not find much evidence that Catholic social doctrine
directly shaped the social provisions of the constitution. But the
whole intellectual and political environment of the time was suf-
fused with the ideas and rhetoric of the Catholic social agenda.26
While the constitution does not provide a definitive indication of its
different inspirations, the platforms of Catholic Social Action and
the National Catholic Party bear remarkable resemblances to the
provisions incorporated into the constitution on labor and agrari-
an reform, in particular—resemblances too strong to be merely
accidental. Article  of the constitution, which runs to several
pages with statutory-like detail on labor rights and working condi-
tions, corresponds in almost every clause to some part of the basic
texts and principles espoused by the Mexican social Catholic move-
ment, from Rerum Novarum to the declarations of the different
national congresses and “Catholic social weeks” of the preceding
decade.27
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There are notable differences, too, between the constitution’s
social and economic agenda and that of Catholic Social Action and
the National Catholic Party. The methods for achieving the reform
that the constitution adopted were more harsh than Catholics had
been inclined to promote, and the constitution pays somewhat less
attention to the cultivation and protection of intermediate forms of
association between the individual and the states, such as the coop-
eratives and mutual-aid societies created under the National
Catholic Party’s auspices. Instead, the constitution entrusts more
power to the state leviathan. Still, even within Catholic social
thought, the emphasis on subsidiarity became more pronounced
only later, with Pope Pius XI’s, Quadragesimo Anno in , and the
rising threat of totalitarianism. Earlier in the century, as in Rerum
Novarum, the church’s concern was more sharply focused on trying
to navigate a way between the Scylla of a brutally atomistic liberal
capitalism and the Charybdis of excessive socialist collectivism.
This narrow way is what Mexican social Catholicism ardently
sought. The Constitution of  shared that basic aim, accepting
the received tradition of individual rights and supplementing it
with greater recognition and protection of the social dimensions of
the human person.
This is the “social liberalism” that Mexico bequeathed to consti-
tutionalism generally and the banner that Mexico carried into the
arena of international human rights a short thirty years later.28 Like
Las Casas and the liberal revolutionaries before them, the architects
of the Mexican constitutional moment of  appropriated the
existing discourse of rights of their time, subjected it to the test of
their experience, and emerged with their own metamorphosed
contribution.
Conclusion
The tradition that Latin Americans brought to the birth of the
international law of human rights in  was as old as the turbu-
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lent encounter between Europe and the New World. From that
time on it persisted with a richness that is mostly unknown and
unappreciated. From its origins, the human rights tradition was
strongly universalistic in its orientation, founded on the equal dig-
nity of all members of the family. Continuing to build on its
scholastic origins, it nevertheless absorbed the political and intel-
lectual currents of republican revolution and produced a constitu-
tional rights language with distinctively positive conceptions of
freedom and the relationship of rights and responsibilities. When
it met the economic and political transformations of the twentieth
century, it aimed at a synthesis of the individualistic and the social
dimensions of human dignity. Sometimes directly and at other
times more passively, but no less certainly, the constant character-
istic of the Latin American human rights tradition was its dynam-
ic relationship with a fundamentally Catholic philosophical
anthropology.
What has happened to this tradition in the explosive globaliza-
tion of the human rights idea since World War II? There is a great
deal left to study and say about the positive Latin American contri-
butions to the more than fifty-year history of international human
rights. The  American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man became the first international instrument recognizing univer-
sal human rights. Later, various diplomatic delegations on the con-
tinent played critical roles in forging international consensus over
the developing norms and institutions of international law regard-
ing problems of racial discrimination and religious intolerance, the
dignity of women and children, and the treatment of workers. The
Inter-American system of human rights continues to give the world
a wealth of thought and action regarding the problems of protect-
ing the dignity of the human person in this hemisphere. At the
more recent international conferences on women, population, and
development, some of the Latin American voices seemed to be
among the few willing to cry out on behalf of a vision of human
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rights faithful to its original fullness and integrity. Even in the con-
tinent’s darkest times of “dirty war,” the responses of many Latin
Americans were worthy of a modern-day Las Casas, tempering the
edge of the idea of universal human rights in the hottest fire of
experience.
Whether a world grappling with the challenges that globalization
poses to human dignity will continue to profit from the presence of
distinct dialects of human rights will depend on Latin Americans and
others understanding themselves to be part of a history and a peo-
ple. In this, as in every field of human knowledge, we will make sense
of the present and see our way forward only by belonging to a tra-
dition handed on to us from the past.
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